# ISU v Mo State – round 1 NEG

## 1NC

### topicality

#### The OBJECT of the action is the judge, not widespread production for development of energy in the United States.

DCSA (Division of Conservation of Solar Application), Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1980 “An Analysis of Federal Incentives used to Stimulate Energy Production”

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/67538352/Federal-Incentives-for-Energy-Production-1980> p42

Discussing governmental actions In a field that lacks consistent Policy is difficult, since boundaries defining energy actions are unclear. All governmental actions probably have at least some indirect relevance to energy. If a consistent Policy did exist, the discussion could focus on those actions that were part of the planned and consistent program. For this analysis, however, boundaries must be somewhat arbitrarily defined. First, this discussion will include only those actions taken by the Federal Government; relevant actions of state and local governments are not considered. Second, the discussion covers only those Federal Government actions in which major causes included an attempt to Influence energy or major effects included some Influence on energy. Within those limits, the discussion considers actions related to both production and consumption, although production receives the most emphasis. It also includes actions relating to both increases and decreases In energy consumption or production. Energy production Is defined as the transformation of natural resources into commonly used forms of energy such as heat, light, and electricity. By this definition, the shining of the sun or the running of a river are not examples of energy production, but the installation of solar panels or the construction of a hydroelectric dam are. Energy consumption is defined as the use of one of these common, "manufactured" forms of energy. Under this definition sunbathing is not energy consumption, but heating water by means of a solar panel is. In both definitions, the crucial ingredient is the application of technology and resources to change a natural resource into a useful energy form.

### capitalism

#### Performative resistance remains trapped within the current hegemonic order and cannot come to terms with capital’s overdetermination of identity. Only a more radical subversion of the entire system can solve.

Slavoj Zizek, researcher in sociology at the university of Ljubljana, The Ticklish Subject: The absent centre of political ontology, 1999, pg. 260-264

The political focus of Butler’s theoretical endeavour is the old leftist one: how is it possible not only actually to resist, but also to undermine and/ or displace the existing socio-symbolic network (the Lacanian ‘big Other’) which predetermines the space within which the subject can only exist?’3 She is well aware, of course, that the site of this resistance cannot be simply and directly identified as the Unconscious: the existing order of Power is also supported by unconscious ‘passionate attachments’ — attachments that must remain publicly non-acknowledged if they are to fulfill their role: If the unconscious escapes from a given normative injunction, to what other injunction does it form an attachment? What makes us think that the uncon¬scious is any less structured by the power relations that pervade cultural signifiers than is the language of the subject? If we find an attachment to subjection at the level of the unconscious, what kind of resistance is to be wrought from that?14 The outstanding case of such unconscious ‘passionate attachments’ that sustain Power is precisely the inherent reflexive eroticization of regulatory power mechanisms and procedures themselves: in an obsessional ritual, the very performance of the compulsive ritual destined to keep illicit temptation at bay becomes the source of libidinal satisfaction. It is thus the ‘reflexivity’ involved in the relationship between regulatory power and sexuality, the way repressive regulatory procedures themselves are libidinally invested and function as a source of libidinal satisfaction, this ‘masochistic’ reflexive turn, which remains unaccounted for in the stan¬dard notion of the ‘internalization’ of social norms into psychic prohibi¬tions. The second problem with the quick identification of the Unconscious as the site of resistance is that even if we concede that the Unconscious is the site of resistance which forever prevents the smooth functioning of power mechanisms, that is, that interpellation — the sub¬ject’s recognition in his/her allotted symbolic place — is always ultimately incomplete, failed, ‘does such resistance do anything to alter or expand the dominant injunctions or interpellations of subject formation?”5 In short: ‘IIt]his resistance establishes the incomplete character of any effort to produce a subject by disciplinary means, but it remains unable to rearticulate the dominant terms of productive power’)” That is the kernel of Butler’s criticism of Lacan: according to her, Lacan reduces resistance to the imaginary misrecognition of the symbolic structure; such a resistance, although it thwarts the full symbolic realiz¬ation, nevertheless depends on it and asserts it in its very opposition, unable to rearticulate its terms: ‘For the Lacanian, then, the imaginary signifies the impossibility of the discursive — that is, symbolic — constitution of identity.”7 Along these lines, she even qualifies the Lacanian Uncon¬scious itself as imaginary, that is, as ‘that which thwarts any effort of the symbolic to constitute sexed identity coherently and fully, an unconscious indicated by the slips and gaps that characterize the workings of the imaginary in language’.’8 Against this background, it is then possible to claim that, in Lacan, ‘psychic resistance presumes the continuation of the law in its anterior, symbolic form and, in that sense, contributes to its status quo. In such a view, resistance appears doomed to perpetual defeat.”9 The first thing to note here is that Butler seems to conflate two radically opposed uses of the term ‘resistance’: one is the socio-critical use (resistance to power, etc.), the other the clinical use operative in psychoanalysis (the patient’s resistance to acknowledging the unconscious truth of his symp¬toms, the meaning of his dreams, etc.). When Lacan effectively determines resistance as ‘imaginary’, he has in mind the misrecognition of the symbolic network which determines us. On the other hand, for Lacan, radical rearticulation of the predominant symbolic Order is altogether possible — this is what his notion of point de capiton (the ‘quilting point’ or the Master-Signifier) is about: when a new point de capiton emerges, the socio-symbolic field is not only displaced, its very structuring principle changes. One is thus tempted to reverse the opposition between Lacan and Foucault as elaborated by Butler (Lacan constrains resistance to imaginary thwarting, while Foucault, who has a more pluralistic notion of discourse as a heterogeneous field of multiple practices, allows for a more thorough symbolic subversion and rearticulation): it is Foucault who insists on the immanence of resistance to Power, while Lacan leaves open the possibility of a radical rearticulation of the entire symbolic field by means of an act proper, a passage through ‘symbolic death’. In short, it is Lacan who allows us to conceptualize the distinction between imaginary resistance (false transgression that reasserts the symbolic status quo and even serves as a positive condition of its functioning) and actual symbolic rearticulation via the intervention of the Real of an act. Only on this level — if we take into account the Lacanian notions of point de capiton and the act as real — does a meaningful dialogue with Butler become possible. Butler’s matrix of social existence (as well as Lacan’s) is that of a forced choice: in order to exist at all (within the socio-symbolic space) one has to accept the fundamental alienation, the definition of one’s existence in the terms of the ‘big Other’, the predom¬inant structure of the socio-symbolic space. As she is quick to add, however, this should not constrain us to (what she perceives as) the Lacanian view according to which the symbolic Order is a given that can be effectively transgressed only if the subject pays the price of psychotic exclusion; so that on the one hand we have false imaginary resistance to the symbolic Norm and, on the other, psychotic breakdown, with the full acceptance of alienation in the symbolic Order (the goal of psychoanalytic treatment) as the only ‘realistic’ option. Butler opposes to this Lacanian fixity of the Symbolic the Hegelian dialectics of presupposing and positing: not only is the symbolic Order always-already presupposed as the sole milieu of the subject’s social existence; this Order itself exists, is reproduced, only in so far as subjects recognize themselves in it and, via repeated performative gestures, again and again assume their places in it — this, of course, opens up the possibility of changing the symbolic contours of our socio-symbolic exist¬ence by way of its parodically displaced performative enactings. That is the thrust of Butler’s anti-Kantianism: she rejects the Lacanian symbolic a priori as a new version of the transcendental framework which fixes the co-ordinates of our existence in advance, leaving no space for the retro¬active displacement of these presupposed conditions. So when, in a key passage, Butler asks —What would it mean for the subject to desire something other than its continued ‘social existence’? If such an existence cannot be undone without falling into some kind of death, can existence nevertheless be risked, death courted or pursued, in order to expose and open to transformation the hold of social power on the conditions of life’s persistence? The subject is compelled to repeat the norms by which it is produced, but the repetition establishes a domain of risk, for if one fails to reinstate the norm ‘in the right way,’ one becomes subject to further sanction, one feels the prevailing conditions of existence threatened. And yet, without a repetition that risks life — in its current organization — how might we begin to imagine the contingency of that organization, and performa¬tively reconfigure the contours of the conditions of life?2’ — the Lacanian answer is clear: ‘to desire something other than its continued “social existence”’, and thus to fall ‘into some kind of death’, to risk a gesture by means of which death is ‘courted or pursued’, indicates precisely how Lacan reconceptualized the Freudian death drive as the elementary form of the ethical act, the act as irreducible to a ‘speech act’ which relies for its performative power on the pre-established set of symbolic rules and/or norms. Is this not the whole point of Lacan’s reading of Antigone’. Antigone effectively risks her entire social existence, defining the socio-symbolic power of the City embodied in the ruler (Creon), thereby ‘falling into some kind of death’ (i.e. sustaining a symbolic death, exclusion from the socio-symbolic space). For Lacan, there is no ethical act proper without taking the risk of such a momentary ‘suspension of the big Other’, of the socio-symbolic network that guarantees the subject’s identity: an authentic act occurs only when the subject risks a gesture that is no longer ‘covered up’ by the big Other. Lacan pursues all possible versions of this entering the domain ‘between the two deaths’: not only Antigone after her expulsion, but also Oedipus at Colonnus, King Lear, Poe’s Mr Valdemar, and so on, up to Sygne from Claudel’s Coufontaine trilogy — their common predicament is that they all found themselves in this domain of the undead, ‘beyond death and life’, in which the causality of symbolic Fate is suspended. One should criticize Butler for conflating this act in its radical dimen¬sion with the performative reconfiguration of one’s symbolic condition via its repetitive displacements: the two are not the same — that is to say, one should maintain the crucial distinction between a mere ‘performative reconfiguration’, a subversive displacement which remains within the hegemonic field and, as it were, conducts an internal guerrilla war of turning the terms of the hegemonic field against itself, and the much more radical act of a thorough reconfiguration of the entire field which redefines the very conditions of socially sustained performativity. It is thus Butler herself who ends up in a position of allowing precisely for marginal ‘reconfigurations’ of the predominant discourse — who remains con¬strained to a position of ‘inherent transgression’, which needs as a point of reference the Other in the guise of a predominant discourse that can be only marginally displaced or transgressed.2’ From the Lacanian standpoint, Butler is thus simultaneously too opti¬mistic and too pessimistic. On the one hand she overestimates the subversive potential of disturbing the functioning of the big Other through the practices of performative reconfiguration/displacement: such practices ultimately support what they intend to subvert, since the very field of such ‘transgressions’ is already taken into account, even engen¬dered, by the hegemonic form of the big Other — what Lacan calls ‘the big Other’ are symbolic norms and their codified transgressions. The Oedipal order, this gargantuan symbolic matrix embodied in a vast set of ideological institutions, rituals and practices, is a much too deeply rooted and ‘substantial’ entity to be effectively undermined by the marginal gestures of performative displacement. On the other hand, Butler does not allow for the radical gesture of the thorough restructuring of the hegemonic symbolic order in its totality.

#### Extinction

Meszaros, prof Philosophy & Political Theory, 95

Istvan Meszaros, 1995, Professor at University of Sussex, England, “Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition”

With regard to its innermost determination the capital system is expansion oriented and accumulation-driven. Such a determination constitutes both a formerly unimaginable dynamism and a fateful deficiency. In this sense, as a system of social metabolic control capital is quite irresistible for as long as it can successfully extract and accumulate surplus-labour-whether in directly economic or in primarily political form- in the course of the given society’s expandoed reproduction. Once, however, this dynamic process of expansion and accumulation gets stuck (for whatever reason) the consequences must be quite devastating. For even under the ‘normality’ of relatively limited cyclic disturbances and blockages the destruction that goes with the ensuing socioeconomic and political crises can be enormous, as the annals of the twentieth century reveal it, including two world wars (not to mention numerous smaller conflagrations). It is therefore not too difficult to imagine the implications of a systemic, truly structural crisis; i.e. one that affects the global capital system not simply under one if its aspects-the financial/monetary one, for instance-but in all its fundamental dimensions, questioning its viability altogether as a social reproductive system. Under the conditions of capital's structural crisis its destructive constituents come to the fore with a vengeance, activating the spectre of total uncontrollability in a form that foreshadows self-destruction both for this unique social reproductive system itself and for humanity in general. As we shall see in Chapter 3, capital was near amenable to proper and durable control or rational self-restraint.

#### Reject on ethics

Zizek and Daly 2k4 (Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears).This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’).

#### Alt: withdraw completely from the ideology of capitalism

Johnston, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory University, 2004 Adrian, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, December v9 i3 p259 page infotrac

Perhaps the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Zizek's recent writings isn't a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Zizek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance (Zizek, 2001d, pp 22-23) (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Zizek, 2000a, p 16). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of "magic," that is, the belief in money's social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance's powers. The "external" obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, "internally" believe in it--capitalism's life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others' belief in the socio-performative force emanating from this same material. And yet, this point of capitalism's frail vulnerability is simultaneously the source of its enormous strength: its vampiric symbiosis with individual human desire, and the fact that the late-capitalist cynic's fetishism enables the disavowal of his/her de facto belief in capitalism, makes it highly unlikely that people can simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking (especially since, as Zizek claims, many of these people are convinced that they already have ceased believing

#### Alt solves the root cause; plan’s incrementalism gets rolled back

http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strategy/GettingFree/ A Sketch of An Association of Democratic, Autonomous Neighborhoods And How to Create It And Other Essays Plus An Annotated Bibliography in English for the Libertarian Left By Jared James 2002

10. Single-issue campaigns. We cannot destroy capitalism with single-issue campaigns. Yet the great bulk of the energies of radicals is spent on these campaigns. There are dozens of them: campaigns to preserve the forests, keep rent control, stop whaling, stop animal experiments, defend abortion rights, stop toxic dumping, stop the killing of baby seals, stop nuclear testing, stop smoking, stop pornography, stop drug testing, stop drugs, stop the war on drugs, stop police brutality, stop union busting, stop red-lining, stop the death penalty, stop racism, stop sexism, stop child abuse, stop the re-emerging slave trade, stop the bombing of Yugoslavia, stop the logging of redwoods, stop the spread of advertising, stop the patenting of genes, stop the trapping and killing of animals for furs, stop irradiated meat, stop genetically modified foods, stop human cloning, stop the death squads in Colombia, stop the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, stop the extermination of species, stop corporations from buying politicians, stop high stakes educational testing, stop the bovine growth hormone from being used on milk cows, stop micro radio from being banned, stop global warming, stop the militarization of space, stop the killing of the oceans, and on and on. What we are doing is spending our lives trying to fix up a system which generates evils far faster than we can ever eradicate them. Although some of these campaigns use direct action (e.g., spikes in the trees to stop the chain saws or Greenpeace boats in front of the whaling ships to block the harpoons), for the most part the campaigns are directed at passing legislation in Congress to correct the problem. Unfortunately, reforms that are won in one decade, after endless agitation, can be easily wiped off the books the following decade, after the protesters have gone home, or after a new administration comes to power. These struggles all have value and are needed. Could anyone think that the campaigns against global warming, or to free Leonard Peltier, or to aid the East Timorese ought to be abandoned? Single issue campaigns keep us aware of what's wrong, and sometimes even win. But in and of themselves, they cannot destroy capitalism, and thus cannot really fix things. It is utopian to believe that we can reform capitalism. Most of these evils can only be eradicated for good if we destroy capitalism itself and create a new civilization. We cannot afford to aim for anything less. Our very survival is at stake. There is one single-issue campaign I can wholehearted endorse: the total and permanent eradication of capitalism.

#### Reject the method of the 1AC

James Marsh, 1995 (Critique, Action, and Liberation, p. 333-335)

To the extent, therefore, that science and technology dominate in the twentieth century as not only the highest forms of reason but the only forms of reason, they shove other, more profound, more reflective, more fundamental forms of reason to the side and twentieth-century industrial society emerges as an inverted, topsy-turvy, absurd world. What seems normal, factual, rational, and sane in such a world is in fact abnormal, apparent, irrational, and absurd. We begin to suspect and see that science and technology appear as the highest and only forms of reason because capitalism has appropriated science and technology for its own ends as productive force and ideology. In science and technology capitalism has found the forms of rationality most appropriate for itself, perfectly manifesting it, mirroring it, and justifying it. In such an absurd, inverted, topsy-turvy world, fidelity to the life of reason demands critique, resistance, and revolutionary transcendence. One has to pierce the veil of such a world, see through it as absurd rather than accepting it as normal and sane. The prevailing rationality is profoundly irrational.'2 A rationality, however, that confines itself to understanding the facts and accepting the facts as normal cannot pierce the veil. Indeed, piercing the veil becomes irrational according to such a definition of reason.

### retreat

#### The affirmative’s attempt to sidestep the costs and benefits of policy implementation demonstrates their orientation toward their stance on solidarity lacks seriousness –this causes serious information asymmetries.

Avner De-Shalit, 2k. Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” p. 20, Questia.

However, it would be wrong, if not dangerous, to blame the 'other'. From the prophets in biblical times to the French revolutionaries and the early Fabians,¶ history is full of examples of theorists and philosophers who abandoned all hope of persuading others throughdeliberation, and became impatient and hence more radical in their ideas¶ . This explains why the shift fromhumanistic to misanthropic attitudes has been rapid.¶ Perhaps the 'easiest' way to solve a problem is to lose faithin a form of gradual change that can still remain respectful of humans. Such an attitude¶ , I believe,¶ onlybrings about a new series of problems encompassing dictatorship, totalitarianism, and lack of personal freedom¶ .¶ In this book I seek to maintain the philosophical impetus, not to point the finger at the politicians or the activists. Rather, I wish to examine ourselves—the philosophers who engage in discussing the environment—to discover how we might construct a theory that is much more accessible to the activists and the general public (without relinquishingany of our goals), and which can be harnessed to the aims of political philosophy. Here, the counter-argument would go something like this: 'OK, so the argumentation supplied by environmental philosophers is so removed from that used by activists and governments. So what? The only outcome of this is that more arguments, or, if you like, a pluralistic set of arguments, will emerge.Some arguments are relevant to academia alone; others can be used in politics. Thus, for example, in the university we could maintain an ecocentric environmental philosophy, 7 whereas in politics anthropocentric 8 arguments would dominate.' In response to this, it could be argued that plurality of argument is indeed welcome. Moreover, as we saw earlier,¶ thedivergence between¶ , say,¶ ecocentric environmental philosophy and anthropocentric environmental philosophy is not so vast in terms of the policies they recommend¶ . In fact,¶ as John Barry argues, 'reformednaturalistic humanism' is capable of supporting a stewardship ethics just as well¶ (J. Barry 1999 :ch. 3).¶ But¶ my point is that¶ saving the environment is not just a matter of theory: it is an urgent political mission¶ .In a democratic system, however,¶ one cannot expect policies to be decided without giving any thought to¶ how these policies should be explained to the public¶ , and thereby gain legitimacy¶ .¶ In other words, the rationale of a policy is an increasingly important, if not inseparable, part of the policy; in particular, the openness and transparency of the democratic regime makes the rationale a crucial aspect of the policy¶ .¶ A policy whose rationale is not open to the public, or one that is believed to be arrived at through a process not open to the public, is considered a-democratic¶ (cf. Ezrahi 1990). Consequently,¶ a policy'slegitimacy is owed not only to its effectiveness, but also to the degree of moral persuasion and convictionit generates within the public arena. So, when constructing environmental policies¶ in democratic regimes,¶ there is a need for a theory that can be used not only by academics, but also by politicians and activists¶ .¶ Hencethe first question in this book is, Why has the major part of environmental philosophy failed to penetrate environmental policy and serve as its rationale? The first part of this book, then, discusses this question and offers two explanations in response. These explanations are based on the premissthat environmental ethics and political theory should be differentiated and well defined so that later on they may join hands, rather than that they should be united in a single theory. It is assumed that they answer two questions. Environmental ethics is about the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. Political theory with regard to the environment relates to the institutions needed to implement and support environmental policies. Thus, the failure to distinguish properly between environmental ethics and political theory underlies the failure of the major part of environmental philosophy to penetrate environmental policy and provide its rationale. In Chapter 1 it is claimed that in a way¶ environmental philosophers have moved too rapidly away fromanthropocentrism—mainstream ethical discourses—towards biocentrism and ecocentrism¶ . 9 My argumentis that¶ the public on the whole is not ready for this¶ , and therefore many activists and potential¶ supporters of the environmental movement become alienated from the philosophical discourse on theenvironment ¶ .¶ In addition, I suggest that the reason for the gap between on the one hand environmental philosophers and on the other activists and politicians is thatenvironmental philosophers have applied the wrong approach to political philosophy. I claim that all moral reasoning involves a process of reflective equilibrium between intuitions and theory. I distinguish between 'private', 'contextual', and 'public' modes of reflective equilibrium, arguing that environmental philosophers use either the first or second mode of reasoning, whereas political philosophyrequires the third: the public mode of reflective equilibrium. The latter differs from the other two models in that it weighs both the intuitions and the theories put forward by activists and thegeneral public (and not just those of professional philosophers). The argument for this being so is that reasoning about the environment needs to include political and democratic philosophy. Andyet, most of environmental philosophers' efforts so far have focused on such questions of meta-ethics as 'intrinsic value theories' and 'biocentrism'. Environmental philosophers have been pushedin this direction out of a genuine desire to seek out the 'good' and the truth, in an effort to ascertain the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. I suggestthat¶ environmental philosophers¶ should not limit themselves to discussing the moral grounds for attitudes, or to trying to reveal the good and the truth, although these areimportant and fascinating questions. At least some of them¶ should instead go beyond this and address the matter of the necessaryinstitutions for implementing policies, and finally, and of no less importance, find a way to persuadeothers to act on behalf of the environment¶ . In other words,¶ while there is a place formeta-ethics¶ , it shouldnot be the only approach to philosophizing about the environment;¶ it should not replace political philosophy

#### The passage of laws to solve the harms of the 1ac devolves into a spectatorial view of politics that collapses the possibility of change – the alternative is to engage in questions of policy as a starting point – this is the only hope for change – specific instances of deliberative democratic politics is good to open the political.

David McClean (Professor of philosophy, taught philosophy at the City University of New York’s Hunter College, Rutgers University (Newark, NJ) and Molloy College philosopher and religious thinker) 2001 “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia. Like light rain released from pretty clouds too high in the atmosphere, the substance of this prose dissipates before it can reach the ground and be a useful component in a discussion of medicare reform or how to better regulate a pharmaceutical industry that bankrupts senior citizens and condemns to death HIV patients unfortunate enough to have been born in Burkina Faso - and a regulatory regime that permits this. It is often too drenched in abstractions and references to a narrow and not so merry band of other intellectuals (Nietzsche, Bataille, Foucault, Lukács, Benjamin) to be of much use to those who are the supposed subject matter of this preternatural social justice literature. Since I have no particular allegiance to these other intellectuals, no particular impulse to carry their water or defend their reputations, I try and forget as much as I can about their writings in order to make space for some new approaches and fresh thinking about that important question that always faces us - "What is to be done?" I am, I think, lucky to have taken this decision before it had become too late. One might argue with me that these other intellectuals are not looking to be taken seriously in the construction of solutions to specific socio-political problems. They are, after all, philosophers engaged in something called philosophizing. They are, after all, just trying to be good culture critics. Of course, that isn't quite true, for they often write with specific reference to social issues and social justice in mind, even when they are fluttering about in the ether of high theory (Lukács, for example, was a government officer, albeit a minister of culture, which to me says a lot), and social justice is not a Platonic form but parses into the specific quotidian acts of institutions and individuals. Social justice is but the genus heading which may be described better with reference to its species iterations- the various conditions of cruelty and sadism which we wittingly or unwittingly permit. If we wanted to, we could reconcile the grand general theories of these thinkers to specific bureaucracies or social problems and so try to increase their relevance. We could construct an account which acts as a bridge to relevant policy considerations. But such attempts, usually performed in the reams of secondary literature generated by their devotees, usually make things even more bizarre. In any event, I don't think we owe them that amount of effort. After all, if they wanted to be relevant they could have said so by writing in such a way that made it clear that relevance was a high priority. For Marxians in general, everything tends to get reduced to class. For Lukács everything tends to get reduced to "reification." But society and its social ills are far too intricate to gloss in these ways, and the engines that drive competing interests are much more easily explained with reference to animal drives and fears than by Absolute Spirit. That is to say, they are not easily explained at all. Take Habermas, whose writings are admittedly the most relevant of the group. I cannot find in Habermas's lengthy narratives regarding communicative action, discourse ethics, democracy and ideal speech situations very much more than I have found in the Federalist Papers, or in Paine's Common Sense, or in Emerson's Self Reliance or Circles. I simply don't find the concept of uncoerced and fully informed communication between peers in a democratic polity all that difficult to understand, and I don't much see the need to theorize to death such a simple concept, particularly where the only persons that are apt to take such narratives seriously are already sold, at least in a general sense. Of course, when you are trying to justify yourself in the face of the other members of your chosen club (in Habermas's case, the Frankfurt School) the intricacy of your explication may have less to do with simple concepts than it has to do with parrying for respectability in the eyes of your intellectual brethren. But I don't see why the rest of us need to partake in an insular debate that has little to do with anyone that is not very much interested in the work of early critical theorists such as Horkheimer or Adorno, and who might see their insights as only modestly relevant at best. Not many self-respecting engaged political scientists in this country actually still take these thinkers seriously, if they ever did at all. Or we might take Foucault who, at best, has provided us with what may reasonably be described as a very long and eccentric footnote to Nietzsche (I have once been accused, by a Foucaltian true believer, of "gelding" Foucault with other similar remarks). Foucault, who has provided the Left of the late 1960s through the present with such notions as "governmentality," "Limit," "archeology," "discourse" "power" and "ethics," creating or redefining their meanings, has made it overabundantly clear that all of our moralities and practices are the successors of previous ones which derive from certain configurations of savoir and connaisance arising from or created by, respectively, the discourses of the various scientific schools. But I have not yet found in anything Foucault wrote or said how such observations may be translated into a political movement or hammered into a political document or theory (let alone public policies) that can be justified or founded on more than an arbitrary aesthetic experimentalism. In fact, Foucault would have shuddered if any one ever did, since he thought that anything as grand as a movement went far beyond what he thought appropriate. This leads me to mildly rehabilitate Habermas, for at least he has been useful in exposing Foucault's shortcomings in this regard, just as he has been useful in exposing the shortcomings of others enamored with the abstractions of various Marxian-Freudian social critiques. Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class." A young scholar, Mark Van Hollebeke who is presenting his essay at another SAAP session, seems to me to take on Walter Benjamin in a bit of the spirit of the type of new public intellectual I would like to see more of, i.e. one willing to assume the risk of taking on the glaring analytic lacunae and self-indulgence of culture critics rooted in ontologies spun out of thin air but cloaked in enough empiricism to get themselves taken seriously. Van Hollebeke's essay, The Pathologies and Possibilities of Urban Life: Dialectical and Pragmatic Sightseeing in New York City is a critique of Benjamin's Das Passagen-Werk (The Arcades Project) in which Benjamin decries the "wish images" of commodity fetishization and the so-called "phantasmagorical" dream world induced by the false consciousness of modernity. Where Benjamin criticizes wish images (essentially connected with stuff you can buy but which also serves to take your mind off of the ideologies of cultural production which oppress you) planted in the arcade as tools of alienation, Van Hollebeke responds with the Pragmatic voice that rehabilitates and reintroduces the wish image as a necessary component of psychological health and communal life, and which need not and does not always take the harmful form of fetishization and alienation that Benjamin insists it does. For Van Hollebeke, the city is not merely an arcade, a decadent place of ideologically deceiving images and of blind subservience to producers' machinations; not merely a place devoid of "reality" and "authenticity," but the site where possibilities are created and played out, where new roles may be found or constructed, wherein we see our own futures, at least partly, in the things we desire. While Van Hollebeke does not explicitly say so - though I wish he did - Benjamin (and so perhaps we) is left facing several important, pragmatic questions. Just what is this "reality" to be had by the critique of "wish images" per se? What is the wish imagery that prompts the philosopher to become a philosopher and how different is the product of the academy from other products which are purchased with far fewer dollars? Is Benjamin's own philosophizing all just a noble pursuit, or were his pursuits of academic credentials, often failures due to the obscurity of his writing, not partly the price to be paid for entry into an elite corps in which membership is jealously guarded (as it was certainly guarded among his friends)? What made Benjamin think he was more than the product of cultural production? The friendly question I would put to Van Hollebeke is why he bothered to take Benjamin seriously to begin with. But Hollebeke is not alone. Stanley Cavell also takes Benjamin seriously, even though he has described the Arcades Project as "a production without a product (a way to think about its claim to philosophy, or rather, to philosophizing)."(2) Cavell meant this reflection to be taken non-pejoratively because he seems to take Benjamin more seriously as an aesthetician and literary metaphysician (in Rorty-speak, as a "strong poet") than as a serious, social commentator with good ideas. Keeping Benjamin and his cohorts in the box of aesthetics and metaphysics is, I believe, good intellectual policy for social critics seeking to be relevant. They should be cited for seasoning and not for meat. . . . Our new president, possessing no towering intellect, talks of a people who share a continent, but are not a nation. He is right, of course. We are only beginning to learn to put tribal loyalties aside and to let ourselves take seriously other more salutary possibilities, though we delude ourselves into believing that we have made great progress. Perhaps so-called "compassionate conservatism," though a gimmick to win a political contest, will bear a small harvest of unintended and positive consequences, although I remain dubious about this if the task of thinking through what it might actually mean remains the chore of George W. Bush. But if the not-too-Neanderthal-Right is finally willing to meet the not-too-wacky-Left at a place of dialogue somewhere in the "middle," then that is good news, provided the Left does not miss the opportunity to rendevous. Yet, there is a problem here. Both the Cultural Left and the Cultural Right tend to be self-righteous purists. The best chance, then, is for the emergence of Rorty's new Political Left, in conjunction with a new Political Right. The new Political Left would be in the better position of the two to frame the discourse since it probably has the better intellectual hardware (it tends to be more open-minded and less dogmatic) to make a true dialogue work. They, unlike their Cultural Left peers, might find it more useful to be a little less inimical and a little more sympathetic to what the other side might, in good faith, believe is at stake. They might leave behind some of the baggage of the Cultural Left's endless ruminations (Dewey's philosophical cud chewing) about commodity fetishization, or whether the Subject has really died, or where crack babies fit into neo-capitalist hegemonies, and join the political fray by parsing and exposing the more basic idiotic claims and dogmas of witless politicians and dangerous ideologues, while at the same time finding common ground, a larger "We" perspective that includes Ronald Reagan and Angela Davis under the same tent rather than as inhabitants of separate worlds. The operative spirit should be that of fraternal disagreement, rather than self-righteous cold shoulders. Yet I am not at all convinced that anything I have described is about to happen, though this essay is written to help force the issue, if only a little bit. I am convinced that the modern Cultural Left is far from ready to actually run the risks that come with being taken seriously and held accountable for actual policy-relevant prescriptions. Why should it? It is a hell of a lot more fun and a lot more safe pondering the intricacies of high theory, patching together the world a priori (which means without any real consideration of those officers and bureaucrats I mentioned who are actually on the front lines of policy formation and regulation). However the risk in this apriorism is that both the conclusions and the criticisms will miss the mark, regardless of how great the minds that are engaged. Intellectual rigor and complexity do not make silly ideas politically salient, or less pernicious, to paraphrase Rorty. This is not to say that air-headed jingoism and conservative rants about republican virtue aren't equally silly and pernicious. But it seems to me that the new public philosopher of the Political Left will want to pick better yardsticks with which to measure herself. Is it really possible to philosophize by holding Foucault in one hand and the Code of Federal Regulation or the Congressional Record in the other? Given that whatever it has meant to be a philosopher has been under siege at various levels, I see no reason why referring to the way things are actually done in the actual world (I mean really done, not done as we might imagine) as we think through issues of public morality and social issues of justice shouldn't be considered a viable alternative to the way philosophy has proceeded in the past. Instead of replacing epistemology with hermeneutics or God knows what else as the foundation of philosophical practice, we should move social philosophers in the direction of becoming more like social and cultural auditors rather than further in the direction of mere culture critics. We might be able to recast philosophers who take-up questions of social justice in a serious way as the ones in society able to traverse not only disciplines but the distances between the towers of the academy and the bastions of bureaucracies seeking to honestly and sometimes dishonestly assess both their failings and achievements. This we can do with a special advantage over economists, social scientists and policy specialists who are apt to take the narrow view of most issues. We do have examples of such persons. John Dewey and Karl Popper come to mind as but two examples, but in neither case was there enough grasp of the actual workings of social institutions that I believe will be called for in order to properly minister to a nation in need of helpful philosophical insights in policy formation. Or it may just be that the real work will be performed by philosophically grounded and socially engaged practitioners rather than academics. People like George Soros come to mind here.

#### Next is the impact—Their retreat to local concerns enables unsolved global problems to assure extinction—Their method solves nothing, but cedes the political to authoritarian reactions.

Louis Rene, Beres (Prof. of International Law at Purdue) 2003 , Journal and Courier, June 5

The truth is often disturbing. Our impressive American victories against terrorism and rogue states, although proper and indispensable, are inevitably limited. The words of the great Irish poet Yeats reveal, prophetically, where our entire planet is now clearly heading. Watching violence escalate and expand in parts of Europe and Russia, in Northern Ireland, in Africa, in Southwest Asia, in Latin America, and of course in the Middle East, we discover with certainty that "... the centre cannot hold/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world/The blood-dimmed tide is loosed/and everywhere The Ceremony of innocence is drowned." Our response, even after Operation Iraqi Freedom, lacks conviction. Still pretending that "things will get better," we Americans proceed diligently with our day-to-day affairs, content that, somehow, the worst can never really happen. Although it is true that we must go on with our normal lives, it is also true that "normal" has now become a quaint and delusionary state. We want to be sure that a "new" normal falls within the boundaries of human tolerance, but we can't nurture such a response without an informed appreciation of what is still possible. For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring. To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

#### Their attempt to sidestep the costs and benefits of policy implementation is the link – it demonstrates their orientation toward their project lacks seriousness

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Politics is about ends and means—about the values that we pursue and the methods by which we pursue them. In a perfect world, there would be a perfect congruence between ends and means: our ends would always be achievable through means that were fully consistent with them; the tension between ends and means would not exist. But then there would be no need to pursue just ends, for these would already be realized. Such a world of absolute justice lies beyond politics. The left has historically been burdened by the image of such a world. Marx’s vision of the “riddle of history solved” and Engels’s vision of the “withering away of the state” were two canonical expressions of the belief in an end-state in which perfect justice could be achieved once and for all. But the left has also developed a concurrent tradition of serious strategic thinking about politics. Centered around but not reducible to classical Marxism, this tradition has focused on such questions as the relations of class, party, and state; the consequences of parliamentary versus revolutionary strategies of social change; the problem of hegemony and the limits of mass politics; the role of violence in class struggle; and the relationship between class struggle and war. These questions preoccupied Karl Kautsky, V.I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Lukàcs, and Antonio Gramsci—and also John Dewey, Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, George Orwell, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus. The history of left political thought in the twentieth century is a history of serious arguments about ends and means in politics, arguments about how to pursue the difficult work of achieving social justice in an unjust world. Many of these arguments were foolish, many of their conclusions were specious, and many of the actions followed from them were barbaric. The problem of ends and means in politics was often handled poorly, but it was nonetheless taken seriously, even if so many on the left failed to think clearly about the proper relationship between their perfectionist visions and their often Machiavellian strategies. What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left—by which I mean “progressive” faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates—has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing—about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq—continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it—about globalization and sweatshops— is new and in some ways promising (see my “Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement,” Dissent, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, and what the likely costs, as well as the benefits, are of any reasonable strategy. One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic—petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives. But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live.

#### Their activist reaction to deliberation lacks epistemic modesty – it engages in a form of knowledge production which replicates injustice

Robert B. Talisse Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University 2006 Deliberativist responses to activist challenges A continuation of Young’s dialectic Philosophy & Social Criticism 31 (4) [In this article, the activist is ‘he’ and the deliberativist is ‘she’]

That Young’s activist is not reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’ (106); activist tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption that questions of justice are essentially settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its implementation requires. He also believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at enlisting other citizens in support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed. The activist implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection to his views concerning justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse because he has judged on a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable. According to the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The deliberativist recognizes that questions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter the activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of power wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve. That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of public deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue; reasonableness hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views, he is literally unable to be reasonable. Hence the deliberative democrat concludes that activism, as presented by Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement. The dialogical conception of reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the activist’s reply to the charge that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist denied this charge on the grounds that activism is aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view, the problem with interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or deplorable) of the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory as fixed dispositions that are non-cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons. Insofar as the activist sees his view of justice as ‘given’ and not open to rational scrutiny, he is engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist rejects. The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

#### This serious political commitment provides the only hope to avoid the worst impacts and the internal links to their offense

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Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left—that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won’t work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means—perhaps the dangerous means—we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that “realism” can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left’s response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to “international law” were naïve. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

### case

#### Identity-politics based activism fail – lets larger society off of the hook – perm solves.

Lisa Duggan, 1994, Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D., “Queering the State,” JSTOR

(3) Identity politics only replaces closets with ghettos. The closet as a cultural space has been defined and enforced by the existence of the ghetto. In coming out of the closet, identity politics offers us another bounded, fixed space of humiliation and another kind of social isolation. Homosexual desire is localized-projected out and isolated in the community of bodies found in the gay ghetto. In this sense, identity politics lets the larger society off the hook of anxiety about sexual difference.7 These critiques are now so well-known and widely circulated in queer studies scholarship and classrooms that, in my own course called "Queer Cultures" at Brown University, there are no worse epithets than to accuse someone of "essentialism," or of engaging in identity politics. This identitybashing is presented as the progressive cutting edge of politics as well as theory-but it can also be framed in ways that are quite reactionary. It can be a way of reinventing the closet, of condescending to lesbian and gay scholars, students, and activists, and of avoiding (if not outright despising) lesbian/gay/queer activism altogether-while posing as politically more progressive than thou. But the critical insights of queer theory might also be mobilized (and, I would argue, should be) to forge a political language that can take us beyond the limiting rhetorics of liberal gay rights and of militant nationalism. When we turn our attention to this project, we run into difficulty the moment we step outside our classrooms, books, journals, and conferences. How do we represent our political concerns in public discourse? In trying to do this, in trying to hold the ground of the fundamental criticism of the very language of current public discourse that queer theory has enabled, in trying to translate our constructionist languages into terms that have the power to transform political practices, we are faced with several difficulties.

#### Sexual acts are distinct from sexual identities - sexualities remain constant regardless of actions.

Tim Edwards, November 1998, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the Univ. of Leicester, Sexualities, Vol. 1, “Queer Fears: Against the Cultural Turn,” p. 471-84, <http://sex.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi/reprint/1/4/471.pdf>

 Despite the proliferation of publicans and populist outpourings on the significance of queer theory and politics, its definition remains distinctly murky and inextricably bound up with an increasingly prescriptive polemic of what it is supposed to mean, often conflated in turn with what it is supposed to do as part of a wider political vision. Some of the explanation for this situation lies in queer theories association with the theory of postmodernity which more widely refutes any attempt at definition or categorization on the grounds that this reinforces the metanarrative it is trying to criticize (Lyotard, 1984). Consequently, queer theory is primarily defined as an attempt to undermine an overall discourse of the sexual categorization and, more particularly, the limitations of the heterosexual-homosexual divide as an identity. Indeed, queer theory often seeks to refute the entire concept of an identity politics as falsely constructing a unitary entity of person. The difficult here is that this tends to locate queer theory in terms of a potentially utopian outcome rather than in an analysis of the present. Many queer theorists would dispute such a claim asserting that sexualities, as they are lived and experienced today, are increasingly open and confused or fragmented and difficult to categorize. While there is some credence to this, particularly in articulate and political circles, the reality for many people much of the time is that their sexualities remain remarkably constant and stable over time even when lived experience may contradict this. The classic case of the heterosexual man who accidentally or intentionally engages in homosexual acts yet maintains an unquestioning attitude towards his heterosexual identity is a primary example of this resilience. To put it more simply, the distinction of sexual acts from sexual identities still stands. Where sexual distinctions do increasingly lose significance is at the level of cultural texts where, not so coincidentally, most queer theory is located.

## 2NC

### retreat

#### Omission doesn’t imply innocence – fictional literature proves it can entail erasure, forgetting, and a culture of complicity.

MELUS: Multi-Ethnic Literature of the U.S. Volume 34, Number 1, Spring 2009 Sins of Omission: Hisaye Yamamoto’s Vision of History Matthew Elliott Emmanuel College 2009 (Project Muse)

“Yoneko’s Earthquake,” “Seventeen Syllables,” and “The Legend of Miss Sasagawara,” written and published during this same period of productivity from 1948 to 1952, further extend Yamamoto’s practice of portraying [End Page 58] and implicitly critiquing acts of complicit silence. As with “Wilshire Bus,” these stories are not explicitly autobiographical but were inspired by her experiences, and the characters that most resemble Yamamoto are presented again in an unflattering light.17 To be sure, these tales portray young, female, nisei protagonists who are innocent and well-intentioned, so when they ultimately consent to an act of historical erasure, they do it with less awareness of the implications of their actions than the more experienced Esther.18 In addition, they are a stark contrast to Melville’s Delano, who poses as well-intentioned while embracing a self-serving act of forgetting that allows him to maintain the power of his position in the racial order without guilt. Yamamoto’s young protagonists, on the other hand, ultimately are injured by the historical omissions to which they give consent. Indeed, the traumas they witness are enabled by racial and gender hierarchies that render these young nisei women powerless, so when they participate in the erasure of victimization, they are by extension also eliding their own oppression, just as Esther’s evasion of an act of racism directed at her seatmate was an avoidance of similar past actions directed at her. Still, these narratives reveal some of the ways that even ostensibly “innocent” characters are folded into a culture of complicity, and thus, also come to commit sins of omission.

#### State can be transformed.

Janice Richardson et. al, 2000, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Exeter, “Feminist perspective on law and theory,” Google Books

In the meantime, we need to reflect on the relationship between the gays in the military debate and the wider question of sexual citizenship. At its simplest, of course, the argument is that denying homosexuals the right to fight for their country denies them full citizenship, given the continuing durability of the relationship between the citizen and the nation-State. This obviously sidesteps the crucial question of the legitimacy of such a strategy in the context of rights agitation. In the same manner as the debate on lesbian and gay marriage, the gays in the military debate is upheld by some as having a destabilising, radical function: opening up one of the most heteronormative State institutions to homosexuals begins the task of undermining heteronormativitv itself+ While there is something appealing about this line of argument, it also needs to be treated with some skepticism, as Carl Stychin notes: I remain convinced that the struggle for the inclusion of ‘out’ gays and lesbians in the US military, and the fight for me-sex marriage, could be discursively deployed to reimagine these central national institutions, and by extension, the ways in which the nation-State has been gendered and sexualised. Although 1 am very skeptical as to whether activism is interested in such a project, these struggles may contain within them the potential to destabilize the construction of the nation.

#### Only state action can effectively challenge heteronormativity – your evidence doesn’t assume new right-wing strategies that make local resistance impossible

Lisa Duggan (Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. 1992) 1994 “Queering the State” JSTOR

But the challenge is not only organizational and financial. The rightwing antigay zealots have mobilized new strategies and new rhetorics that challenge the customary practices, arguments, and slogans of liberal gay rights organizations. Successful opposition to the onslaught on the local, state, and national levels will require more than gearing up another round of the same kind of struggle. The opposition has changed its colors, and so must we. The crisis specifically challenges those of us who teach and write about queer issues. We have already been faced with the rhetoric of crisis in higher education, mobilized by conservatives-a rhetoric that targets teaching and scholarship in the areas of class, race, gender, and sexuality as "politically correct" and as an effort to split, fragment, and destroy the idea of a common culture transmitted through education. In right-wing attacks on the state of higher education, lesbian and gay teachers and writers are often singled out as scholars of the particularly frivolous and absurd, though we are also often represented as uniquely powerful, able to overwhelm and destroy the very conception of a common culture. These attacks are now paralleled by similar ones launched in the arena of national politics. Lesbian and gay efforts to secure civil rights protections have quickly become central in public debates of various kinds since the election of Bill Clinton. In conservative attacks on the new administration, queers are represented as ridiculous, with trivial political concerns, but also as a frightfully controlling presence in national politics. Shrill cries of the dominance of the Gay Lobby have been mobilized with lightning speed, especially in response to the debates surrounding the military. Local and state initiatives to roll back or prevent antidiscrimination measures pick up and elaborate these themes, as they also try out new strategies and rhetorics. Even in friendly internal critiques of the state of progressive politicscritiques in which the problem of fragmentation is addressed-gay and lesbian politics are sometimes invoked to represent the narrowing of focus (what could be narrower?) and the neglect of the common interest. In a field of progressive alliances often pejoratively described as a conglomeration of "special interest groups," lesbian and gay organizations seem to represent the most "special" interests of all. In this way we appear, on both the right and the left, as signifiers of the "crisis" of liberal politics itself.4 The problem for those of us engaged in queer scholarship and teaching, who have a stake in queer politics, is how to respond to these attacks at a moment when we have unprecedented opportunities (we are present in university curriculums and national politics as never before), yet confront perilous and paralyzing assaults. It is imperative that we respond to these attacks in the public arena from which they are launched. We cannot defend our teaching and scholarship without engaging in public debate and addressing the nature and operations of the state upon which our jobs and futures depend. In other words, the need to turn our attention to state politics is not only theoretical (though it is also that). It is time for queer intellectuals to concentrate on the creative production of strategies at the boundary of queer and nation-strategies specifically for queering the state.5

#### Policy advocacy can productively shift even entrenched structures

Rodger A. Payne (Professor of Political Science at the University of Louisville) September 2007 “Neorealists as Critical Theorists: The Purpose of Foreign Policy Debate” 5 Perspectives on Politics, pp. 503-14.

Generally, the constructivist and critical theoretical scholars who have taken the communicative turn in IR are centrally interested in the form and function of public discourse. They find that political communication serves key social purposes, reflecting the intentions and preferences of various actors. Political actors engaged in public advocacy try to present compelling ideas and attempt to persuade others that a particular decision or normative ideal is the most appropriate for a given situation. Indeed, constructivists have spent much of the past decade or so explaining that persuasive communicative acts are the chief means by which appealing ideas are translated into norms, as the “subjective becomes the intersubjective.”3 Achieving this kind of collective interest presumes that individuals reflect upon information conveyed in communicative acts, even when ideas are fiercely contested, and then develop shared understandings about appropriate behavior.4 Some IR scholars influenced by public sphere theory additionally argue that open political debate about world politics promotes public accountability and thereby potentially democratizes nation states, national foreign policy choices, or international institutions.5 Public opposition to the status quo can pose a direct challenge to those who wield arbitrary political power. Overt dissent can undermine the credibility and thereby erode the strength of even highly coercive power structures, such as the former Soviet state and empire.6 In more democratic contexts, lies and other deceptive communicative practices can be revealed and powerful actors can experience the collapse of their public standing and legitimacy. Frankfurt school social theorist Jürgen Habermas explains how the “forceless force of the better argument” can alter well-entrenched political power structures: Even in more or less power-ridden public spheres, the power relations shift as soon as the perception of relevant social problems evokes a crisis of consciousness at the periphery. If actors from civil society then join together, formulate the relevant issue, and promote it in the public sphere, their efforts can be successful, because the endogenous mobilization of the public sphere activates an otherwise latent dependency built into the internal structure of every public sphere . . . the players in the arena owe their influence to the approval of those in the gallery.7 By contrast, communicative action that promotes normative consensus and reduces the distorting influence of material power in a public discourse can help create political structures that reflect “legitimate social purpose.”8 In short, a functioning public sphere can radically transform both domestic and international political systems.

#### Legislative, incremental changes are key to the successful continuation of queer theorizing – and the movement from theorizing to positive action

Katie Miller, spent the first half of her undergraduate education at the United States Military Academy, could not square her honor as an aspiring Army Officer with the daily half-truths required from her under the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, joined the founding board of OutServe - the association of actively-serving LGBT servicemembers, Truman scholar and Point Foundation scholar, Miller graduated in 2012 from Yale University with a B.A. in political science, “DADT Repeal Under Fire? In Defense of the Repeal Against the Queer Critique,” Huffington Post, October 20, 2011, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katie-miller/dadt-repeal-queer-critique_b_1011431.html>, accessed 1-6-2013.

This tension between the gay and the queer communities is often framed as the gays, the privileged minority group, reaping benefits from a victory that does not help the more marginalized of the LGBT community. As shown by the racist, classist and sexist statistics associated with the policy, this is clearly untrue. Furthermore, DADT repeal has the potential to become the institutional change about which queer theorists, well, theorize. As much as we gay military activists preach that a post-repeal military will look the same as before, the military will become more egalitarian and more accepting over time. It's not exactly an overhaul of traditional systems of power, but it's a start. My message to queer critics of DADT repeal: stop theorizing and seize the opportunity to implement real, tangible and practical change.

#### Incremental victories are key to larger goals

Jason Burke Murphy, Faculty, Elms College¶ PhD, Saint Louis University, 2008.¶ Areas of specialization:¶ Social and Political Philosophy,¶ Normative Ethics,¶ Continental Philosophy,¶ Areas of interest:¶ Continental Philosophy,¶ Social and Political Philosophy,¶ European Philosophy,¶ Normative Ethics,¶ Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality, “Baby Steps: On the Need for Incremental Victories,” St. Louis University, 2010, [www.usbig.net/papers/198-Murphy--Baby\_Steps.doc](http://www.usbig.net/papers/198-Murphy--Baby_Steps.doc), accessed 1-6-2013.

A core principle in organizing is the need for incremental victories. One needs to show members (or the whole public) that it is possible to win. Also, pursuing smaller victories forces members to learn how to organize and to develop leaders. These victories, combined with further organizing, should enable larger-scale goals to come later into play. Even organizations that seek a large-scale goal needs to have a chain of wins that lead towards that goal.

## 1NR

### topicality

#### Their definition of the colon is bad.

David Heidt, 4-8-2005, NDT champion and debate coach @ Emory, “[eDebate] Re: Zomp and James,” <http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-April/061781.html>

The debate community is obviously not the legislative body this evidence refers to, but I doub't you'll come up with another definition of "resolved" that both applies it to the resolutional context and even comes close to an alternate interpretation. This is clearly the origin of the word. Now, you can maybe make the argument that context doesn't matter, that we should all make up our own interpretations of what words mean because that's truly liberating, and that you really need to prefer our interpretation b/c its vital to our ability to topically defecate in debate--but any determination that context doesn't matter is also a determination to just ignore the topic altogether. The same reasons to prefer your alternate interpretation of resolved easily justify preferring an alternate, made up interpretation of any other word in the topic. I guess when you say that most no plan teams you've seen are topical, you must really mean that these no plan teams just assert they're germane to the topic b/c at one point they said the word "energy", or maybe just "the", or that they're topical b/c "U.S." means "us" or "resolved" means "ignore everything after the colon". They may have an outrageous interpretation of certain words, but that doesn't make them topical.

#### Studies prove—depth is better than breadth.

Arrington 09 (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic.

#### An orientation toward a topic encourages a thorough epistemology without restricting creativity and freedom.

Cauthen, 1997

Kenneth Cauthen, the John Price Crozer Griffith emeritus Professor of Theology at Colgate Rochester Crozer Divinity School, “Relativism and Ethics: What is Truth - does it matter?” http://www.bigissueground.com/philosophy/cauthen-relativism2.shtml

I have written on subjects in theology, ethics, and philosophy and developed an outlook at least in minimalist terms that is to me convincing.[5] My intention is to describe reality as it is, to lay out propositions that correspond with the objectively existing state of affairs. Yet such is the depth of my acknowledgment of relativism and my skepticism that I do not find it useful to ask whether statements about God, the meaning of life, and the moral obligations of human beings are literally true or even approximately represent things as they really are. Non-relativists who hold certain positions with great confidence have no alternative but to say that those who disagree with them are wrong. I am not prepared to say that those who disagree with me on moral, metaphysical, and religious matters are wrong. I just say I see it differently and will act on my own convictions in appropriate ways, and that includes opposing those who differ with means proportionate to the seriousness of the issue. I also assume that every other religious, moral, and metaphysical claim is no less relative in principle than mine. Relativism, however, does not preclude passion, commitment, and action in line with one's own relative viewpoint. It ideally produces humility accompanied by acts of love in the quest for justice and an openness to deeper insight. Moreover, all claims about morality and religion can be tested by myself and others but without certain or absolutely conclusive results. The first criterion is theoretical. I can employ the rational test of coherence (internal consistency with all other propositions I affirm) and the empirical test of evidence (adequacy in accounting for the full range of experience). Yet I know that however successful I may be in applying these tests of truth, the outcome is such that only one who stands where I stand will see what I see. All I can say is that this is the best I have been able to come up with so far. Methods of justifying claims are internal to the point of view being tested and part of it, so that no method provides a way of escaping the relativity that marks all belief systems. The second and most important test is practical. Is the outlook useful in interpreting the whole range of my experience in an adequate (rationally plausible) way and in providing guidance in coping with life? When I live by what I find convincing as a rational being, are the results satisfactory and satisfying judged by the best standards available to me up to now as I continue to learn and revise both my theory and my practices? One hopes that learning, maturity, and experience will lead to increasingly adequate and fulfilling ways of believing and living, loving and hoping, thinking and acting. In the end I am a pragmatist who in the presence of the ultimate questions abandons the hope of knowing with certainty what the ultimate answers are. Nevertheless, I find in my own outlook a way of thinking and living more useful and productive than any alternatives available to me at this time. Are my religious and moral convictions literally true? Do they correspond with reality? These questions are interesting but futile. It would be the greatest miracle of all time if out of all the religions and philosophies every produced on this earth, it turned out that my own was the closest of any to getting it right, telling it like it is, picturing objective reality so that the picture and pictured are remarkably alike! I have a better chance of winning the grand lottery at chances of a 100, 000, 000 to 1. Yet I must live some way, believe something, hope for what seems most likely, and die trusting it was not all in vain. I proceed, then, as a relativist, a pragmatist, and a skeptic who employs correspondence theory as far as it will take me, but beyond the ordinary facts of mundane life, that is not very far, especially when one enters the realms of morality and religion.

#### Our arguments address the foundational layer of debate – this comes first.

Paul Saurette, 2000, PhD Johns Hopkins, International Journal of Peace Studies 5:1

The problem of concepts -- what they are, where they are located, how we create/discover them -- has always been close to the heart of philosophy and extends deep into the sciences and social sciences.  Within IR, this concern has generally been located in the sphere of methodology and it remains crucial to the various behaviourist - positivist - empiricist - traditionalist debates.  All but the most stubborn empiricists accept that concepts influence our thinking, the validity of studies and the utility of certain perspectives. It is not surprising, then, that some of the most heated debates in the history of IR (and international law) have focused on the proper place, method and definition of certain key concepts such as sovereignty, war, human rights, anarchy, institutions, power, and international. If all concepts are equally created, however, some become represented and treated as more equal than others. There are, in fact, different layers of conceptual understanding and degrees of articulability and these render certain concepts more or less subject to question.[8](http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol5_1/saurette.htm#Notes#Notes) In any debate, certain understandings are shared by its participants and certain concepts must be common for communication to occur.  These concepts become the foundational layer of the debate, rarely being raised for consideration, but profoundly shaping the contours of the debate.  There have been two traditionally philosophical responses to this.  The first, more familiar to mainstream IR, might be seen as the empiricist and positivist response in which the importance of this layer is minimized and its concepts represented as 'preliminary assumptions', 'term variables', or 'operative definitions' -- voluntarily accepted concepts that are hypothetically and tentatively accepted for their heuristic value.  Because many empiricists and positivists accept an understanding of language and thought as transparent and instrumental, they generally assume that, with enough effort, all of our fundamental assumptions and concepts can be clarified and their consequences known -- allowing for, if not truthful representation, then at least useful manipulation.  While this has perhaps been the prevalent view within English philosophy since the scientific revolution, a second approach, what has been called the continental tradition of philosophy, has consistently challenged these premises.  From this perspective, Kant's definition of the project of philosophy as the search for the transcendental conditions of thought and morality is the paradigmatic challenge to the English tradition of empiricism. According to Kant (and shifting him into the language of this essay), there exist certain natural preconditions -- transcendental fields -- of thought that allow us to make sense of experience.  And while some of these necessary preconditions (categories and concepts) can be traced and categorized, others, such as the constitutive and regulative Ideas, cannot be known with the same theoretical rigor.  On this view, the concepts (Ideas) of this deep layer of shared understandings (experience) are not  transparent and available to examination.